February 27, 2004– Vol. 2
– No.3
LulaWatch Focusing on Latin America's
new "axis of evil"
In the previous LulaWatch, we analyzed
the foreign policy of the Lula da Silva government. We saw
how the central thrust of this policy is aimed at effecting
an important leftist-oriented geo-strategic change in South
America to counter the orientation and policies of the present
American administration.
We will now analyze other aspects of this
foreign policy which focus on the war on terrorism, the
Middle East and the Brazilian government’s efforts
“to throw the balance of forces” in the area
out of kilter. All this comes at a time when that region
is going through considerable changes due to the fall of
Saddam Hussein’s regime and Libya’s backtracking
from its refusal to allow international organizations to
carry out inspections in its territory.
Fingerprinting
and photographing of American tourists
The first foreign policy clash was the momentous case of
photographing and fingerprinting visitors bearing American
passports upon arrival. It was in reply to American requirements
for foreign visitors.
The ruling was established at the beginning
of the year by a provisional judicial order issued by a
judge from Mato Grosso State.
In the first few weeks, press reports
extensively covered the lack of preparation and inefficiency
of Brazilian immigration authorities who registered visitors.
They described the inconvenience and aggravation of long
hours spent in line. Even nursing babies had their little
fingers smudged with ink for fingerprinting.
The Lula da Silva government deftly skirted
responsibility by saying it was a judicial decision. However,
subsequent events showed that the government supported the
measure and was possibly behind it. Veja magazine
called the judicial decision an “anti-American measure.”
The judge’s close ties with the left
and the Workers’ Party (PT) only reinforced this idea.
He began his career as a PT lawyer and had been affiliated
with the Party until recently.
Commenting on the judge’s close
relationship with PT, the Chamber of Deputies’ Foreign
Relations Committee president, Dep. Zulaiê Cobra (from
the PSDB, Party of Brazilian Social Democracy), said the
episode only served to show that Workers’ Party members
do not like the United States and that it seemed they are
simply getting even with the Americans.
The Lula da Silva government’s complicity
with the judicial measure, which many Brazilian observers
deemed an absurd retaliation, became clearer as time went
by. “The inertia of Itamaraty and the Ministry of
Justice is giving Washington the feeling that the government
is in cahoots and supports the measure,” commented
Luís Nassif in an article in the Folha de S.
Paulo (“Bravata perigosa,” 1/8/2004).
That government position was finally officialized
with the publication of an order signed by the Foreign Relations
Minister, the Justice Minister and the Attorney General,
and approved by President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva,
maintaining the requirement.
A highly
criticized measure
The measure caused considerable uneasiness and drew widespread
criticism in Brazil. Innumerable letters to the editor expressed
disagreement and displeasure.
Several analysts pointed out that the
Brazilian government’s intention was clearly to attack
the United States, since the fingerprinting has no practical
purpose.
“You can only draw one conclusion.
In practice, fingerprinting Americans is undue retaliation
. . . that creates an absolutely unnecessary point of attrition
in relations between Brasilia and Washington,” wrote
O Estado de S. Paulo in its main editorial, titled
“The Pointless Fingerprinting of Americans”
(1/6/2004).
The leading news magazine Veja
pointed out: “Behind this decision is yet another
manifestation of anti-American feeling that can be observed
in several sectors of Brazilian society such as intellectual,
military, corporate circles, and particularly in the political
world” (“Olho por olho, dedo por dedo,”
Monica Weinberg, 1/14/2004).
Eduardo Vampré do Nascimento, President
of the Union of Tourist Enterprises of the State of Sao
Paulo, wrote an article where he warned that the fingerprinting
and photographing requirements of the American government
are explicable by the need to guarantee security in a country
that underwent a severe attack. This is absolutely not the
case with Brazil. “To ignore this is like trying to
cover up the sun with a sieve” (“Fichamento.
Era o que faltava...,” O Estado de S. Paulo,
1/13/2004).
Ideological
opposition to the fight against terrorism
It appears the more profound reason behind the fingerprinting
measure is the left’s ideological opposition to the
anti-terrorist struggle on an international level of the
present American administration. In tune with the left worldwide,
Pres. Lula da Silva’s government manifests a strange
opposition to this anti-terrorist fight. One example is
its strong stance against the war in Iraq. This opposition
goes so far as to make strange links with countries that
promote terrorism.
In this sense, Veja thus describes
the “vengeful and discriminatory provisional measure
against Americans” in this manner: “Brazil has
become the first non-Arab country to oppose American anti-terrorist
measures” (Monica Weinberg, “Olho por olho,
dedo por dedo,” 1/14/2004).
Guerrillas
from Colombia and Peru acting in Brazil
The measure against Americans is in stark contrast with
news reports on how guerrillas from Colombia and Peru are
being allowed to roam freely in Brazil. An intelligence
analyst of the Amazon Military Command, quoted by the press,
said there is growing tension along Brazil’s northern,
northwestern and western borders.
The press also reported growing suspicion
that FARC guerrillas and drug traffickers are operating
on Brazilian soil. Elite FARC groups in Brazil are reportedly
engaged in money-laundering, armed protection of drug traffickers,
preparing logistics and setting up supply lines.
The recent capture of leading FARC guerrilla
Ricardo Palmera in Ecuador only served to aggravate the
picture. Bogota’s El Tiempo newspaper quoted
anonymous sources in Colombian military intelligence as
saying that Palmera had visited Brazil several times. The
paper also says `Trinidad´ (as Palmera was known)
was making a stopover in Quito on his way to participate
in a secret guerilla summit in Manaus, Brazil, when he was
nabbed (cf. “Líder das Farc visitou o Brasil
no ano passado, afirma El Tiempo,” Folha de S.
Paulo, 1/6/2004).
Reports say guerrillas from Peru’s
Shining Path movement are also present in Brazil. According
to military sources, these guerrillas are engaged in operations
to help finance their revolution, such as protecting drug
traffickers, smuggling precious Brazilian woods out of the
country, and selling weapons to organized crime. These guerrillas
have already clashed with Brazilian armed forces.
In the midst of all this activity, the
Lula da Silva government steadfastly refuses to declare
FARC a terrorist group. The press speculates that this attitude
allows the guerrillas to operate in Brazil. If declared
a terrorist organization, the government would be obliged
to freeze all assets and authorize the capture of guerrillas
inside its borders.
Finally, American authorities have often
focused on the tri-country border area (Brazil-Argentina-Paraguay)
as a place where there are suspects linked with terrorist
groups active in the Middle East. The Brazilian government
persists in denying such links.
Lula’s
controversial trip to the Middle East
The Brazilian president spent the end of 2003 in the Middle
East on a journey that Veja magazine called “Lula’s
tour of dictatorships.”
Presidential aides called his itinerary
– which included several dictatorships and even regimes
suspected of supporting terrorism – “historic.”
Moreover, it represented an “audacious policy”
that provided an “alternative” to the American
agenda.
Consistent with the crafty attitudes that
have characterized the Lula da Silva administration, Brazilian
foreign policymakers said the primary purpose of the trip
was to develop trade relations. However, after only a few
days, several publications saw through this claim and said
the trip’s real purpose was highly political.
Veja said the trip brought no
commercial gain and had no positive effect on the economy.
“There were many promises of closer
economic relations but few concrete deals. This was the
economic result of President Luiz Inácio Lula da
Silva’s 9-day trip to five Arab countries,”
wrote Reuters’ correspondent Walter Brandimarte.
Along the same line, the Folha de S. Paulo
headlined:
“Lula returns only with promises
for [future] deals.” The article claimed ”great
promises but few deals is the commercial end result of President
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s trip.”
In the Jornal do Brasil, Augusto
Nunes said no visible deals were made: “How could
he have excluded Saudi Arabia, Brazil’s biggest partner
in the region? Why call Libyan tyrant, Muammar Kadaffi,
a ‘friend?’ Kadaffi did not even allow meetings
between executives of [Libya’s] state oil company
and the president of Petrobrás.” (“Só
o professor sabe de tudo,” 12/14/2003).
João Hermann, a congressman from
the Popular Socialist Party (the former Brazilian Communist
Party) and part of Lula’s retinue, emphasized the
trip’s political nature: “We are setting foot
here to throw the balance of forces in this region out of
kilter” (Fernando Rodrigues, “Lula e ditador
sírio pedem fim da ocupação do Iraque,”
12/5/2003).
Trip Criticized
in Brazil and Abroad
Lula’s trip was criticized by the press as “a
geo-political affront to Washington’s interests and
a display of Third World mercantilism.” Analysts lambasted
a “result-driven diplomacy” that tramples upon
human rights.
Former Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso
Lafer did not mince words about the President’s trip.
He said Lula’s diplomacy shows a desire to “play
for the home crowd.” In an editorial on his statements,
the newspaper O Estado de S. Paulo said: “It
is not possible to revive the Third World movement ... What
is possible, and even worse, as Celso Lafer warns, is to
`transpose the labor union view of worker versus employer’
to foreign policy. In other words, seeking to foment ‘class
struggle’ on an international scale” (“O
que o Brasil quer e o que o Brasil pode,” 12/12/2003).
The Financial Times also criticized
the president’s trip. Lula’s justification for
meeting the region’s leaders, the paper said, was
a “challenge” to the U.S. “Lula’s
travels through the Middle East and his visit to Cuba have
a political connotation” (“Risco para relação
com os EUA,” Jornal do Brasil; “Financial
Times vê risco para relações com EUA,”
O Estado de S. Paulo; and “Visita de Lula
traz ‘riscos políticos,’” Folha
de S. Paulo, 12/4/2003).
Lula
da Silva drags Mercosul into his diplomatic plans
Former Argentine President Eduardo Duhalde is now president
of Mercosul’s Commission of Permanent Representatives
and participated in the official Brazilian Middle East caravan.
The presence of President Nestor Kirchner’s political
godfather on a trip to visit Arab dictatorships opposed
to American policy in the region served to demonstrate a
political willingness of Brazilian foreign policymakers
to drag at least Argentina with it.
Lula’s trip also served to reiterate
invitations for an unprecedented meeting in Brazil between
Arab and South American heads of state. Yasser Arafat accepted
one such invitation.
“If successful, the meeting between
South Americans and Arabs will be one of the most audacious
symbolic moves of Brazilian foreign policy under the PT
leadership” (Fernando Rodrigues, “Lula planeja
reunião de cúpula com árabes,”
Folha de S. Paulo, 12/3/2003).
Syria’s
hostility to the United States and Israel
President Lula da Silva started his trip with Syria. Bashar
al-Assad’s strongly anti-American speech about Iraq
and the Palestinian conflict made clear the political nature
of the visit.
Presidents Luiz Inácio Lula da
Silva and Bashar al-Assad issued a joint communiqué
asking for the end of Iraq’s “occupation”
and the return of the Golan Heights to Syria. Lula also
vigorously defended the creation of a Palestinian state.
From the diplomatic standpoint, Lula da
Silva’s visit to Syria took on a special symbolism.
In an article in the Jerusalem Post, Nir Boms, a senior
fellow at the Council for Democracy and Tolerance and Erick
Stakelbeck, a head writer for the Investigative Project,
a Washington-based counter terrorism research institute,
stated:
“From sponsoring and hosting
Hizbullah, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad terrorists,
to aiding the flow of Islamic militants into Iraq, Bashar
Assad's Syria has proven a brazen foe of US interests
and a perennial threat to peace in the Middle East”
(“Free Damascus,” 11/27/2003).
Syria is known as a haven for Palestinian
terrorists attacking Israel. By adopting Syria’s position
in the dispute with Israel, Pres. Lula da Silva failed to
condemn that brand of terrorism.
In its main editorial, the newspaper O
Estado de S. Paulo emphasized this symbolic aspect
of President Lula’s trip: “It started in Syria,
which for many years has been on the list of states that
sponsor terrorism and is accused of attempting to violate
non-proliferation rules on chemical, biological and missile
technology. It recently allowed Arab guerrillas to go into
Iraq to attack American troops” (“Uma viagem
inoportuna,” 12/5/2003).
Professor Denis Rosenfield of the Federal
University of Rio Grande do Sul, in an article titled “Principles
and Products,” wrote: “The interesting datum
is that the President made this kind of statement in Syria,
a country governed by a hereditary dictatorship characterized
by the systematic elimination of opponents. ... Furthermore,
Syria militarily occupies Lebanon, which it has turned into
a protectorate” (O Estado de S. Paulo, 12/15/2003).
Writing about the joint communiqué,
journalist Eliane Cantanhêde emphasized the contradictions
in Lula’s diplomacy: “Frankly, it looks like
an unnecessary provocation. ... Or, if you will, pure ‘diplomatic
machismo.’ A ‘machismo’ that was missing
when Lula went in and out of Cuba in silence, disappointing
those who expected him to condemn Fidel Castro’s political
executions” (Eliane Cantanhêde, “O conteúdo
certo no lugar errado,” Folha de S. Paulo,
12/5/2003).
Reactions
to Lula’s visit
According to Paulo Sotero, Washington correspondent of O
Estado de S. Paulo, Lula’s statement was not
well received in the American capital: “An official
source commented, ‘if he said something like asking
for the end of Iraq’s occupation, that will be a big
disappointment’ . . . He goes on to say Washington
is beginning to look at Lula’s diplomacy with perplexity:
“When you go to Cuba and talk about democracy and
say nothing about the importance of respecting human rights,
or when you go to Syria and call for a return of the Golan
Heights but say nothing about the rights of Israel to have
safe borders, you leave doubts as to what precisely you’re
trying to accomplish,’ the source said” (“EUA
acompanham viagem ao Oriente Médio com atenção,”
12/5/2003).
For his part, Israel’s ambassador
to Brazil said: “Israel is in the Golan only because
of the daily Syrian attacks coming from the area before
1967” (“Israel reage com cautela às posições
de Lula,” O Estado de S. Paulo, 12/5/2003).
According to the Folha de S. Paulo,
“there is a clear uneasiness among Jewish leaders
regarding Lula’s statements in the Middle East. The
president defended the creation of a Palestinian state and
condemned settlements in the occupied territories without
placing equal emphasis on terrorism against Israel”
(“Sem outro lado,” 12/5/2003).
Changing
“the world’s political and commercial geography”
In Beirut, Lula continued the Third World rhetoric of a
North-South struggle by again criticizing the way rich countries
protect their economies. He also said that “it is
time for us to change the world’s commercial geography.”
He said that change means “South America should look
to the Arab world” (cf. Fernando Rodrigues, “No
Líbano, Lula defende uma nova ‘geografia comercial,’”
Folha de S. Paulo, 12/6/2003).
In the United Arab Emirates, Lula went
even further and called for an ”aggressive”
foreign policy to increase the influence of new regional
blocs in the world market to counter the United States.
In Egypt, he held a private meeting with
President Hosni Mubarak about the conflict in the Middle
East. On his way out, he said he felt both he and Mubarak
were in complete agreement.
Still in Cairo, Pres. Lula da Silva spoke
to a plenary session of the Arab League (the first Latin
American president to do so) and made a strong call for
closer relations between South America and the Arab world:
“We need to intensify our high level political contacts.”
He also said a summit meeting between South America and
the Arab world will be held in Brazil in the future and
announced the reopening of the League’s diplomatic
representation in Brasilia.
Lula da Silva also insisted on building
a “new political and commercial geography for the
world.” In the beginning of his international trip,
the President spoke of “‘redesigning commercial
geography.’ He has now broadened his scope for a ‘new
political and commercial geography of the world,’”
comments Fernando Rodrigues in Folha de S. Paulo.
And he concludes: “It was kind of a more aggressive
repetition of what Lula had already said in the Arab countries
he first visited” (“Lula critica Bush e diz
que a guerra do Iraque é um erro,” 12/10/2003).
During a luncheon for representatives
of the Arab League’s 22 countries, Brazil’s
President criticized Bush and the war in Iraq, surprising
even Brazilian diplomats and members of his retinue, who
sought to downplay his statements.
Meeting
with “friends:” - Gadhafi, Ortega and Ben Bella
Lula’s visit to Libya was perhaps the most controversial
part of his trip. The Libyan government gave him a warm
reception. “In the ‘tent’ of the Libyan
president, Lula took the initiative of giving Gadhafi a
fraternal and warm handshake” (Denise Chrispim Marin,
“Petróleo é o tema na polêmica
visita a Kadafi,” O Estado de S. Paulo, 12/10/2003).
Veiling the ideological nature of his
meeting with Gadhafi, Lula thus sought to justify his visit:
“Today, as president of Brazil, I never forget those
who were my friends before I became president” (“Lula
tenta explicar visita a ditador,” 12/11/2003). According
to the Jornal do Brasil, Lula met with two other
leftist leaders during the dinner, Daniel Ortega and Ahmed
Ben Bella.
The newspaper O Estado de S. Paulo
added: “Lula also mentioned another meeting in Libya
that took place back in 1982 when he already presided over
PT. In that meeting, he recalled he had already received
‘good teachings’ from Gadhafi, Ortega, Ben Bella
and Yasser Arafat” (Denise Chrispim Marin, “Kadafi
não aprova plano de integração de Lula,”
O Estado de S. Paulo, 12/11/2003). The press said
Lula treated former guerrilla fighters Ortega and Ben Bella
with special deference.
The trip’s
ideological purpose
Professor Denis Lerrer Rosenfield noted: “Nothing
happens by chance in a well-organized diplomatic trip. Symbols
speak for themselves. Around the same dining table were
gathered our president, dictator Gadhafi, Sandinista leader
Daniel Ortega, and Algerian leader Ben Bella . . . Prompted
to clarify the reason for his participation, Lula is reported
to have answered that he does not abandon his ‘friends.’
Castro and Chavez are also his friends. So the question
is: why are so many dictators and revolutionaries among
his friends? Isn’t there something strange going on
here?” (“Princípios e produtos,”
O Estado de S. Paulo, 12/15/2003).
Demetrio Magnoli, a sociologist and doctor
in human geography, said Libya’s inclusion in the
presidential trip is not justified: “This visit has
taken on a symbolic character of fraternizing with the dictator.
It lends an image of legitimacy to that dictatorial regime.”
And he added: “The interests of this trip do not correspond
to the national interest, but to ideological interests of
PT.”
José Augusto Guilhon, coordinator
of the Center of International Relations at the University
of Sao Paulo, said Lula profited from his visit to Gadhafi
“from an ideological standpoint” (cf. “Encontro
com Kadaffi causa polêmica,” Jornal do Brasil,
12/11/2003).
According to Arthur Ituassú, professor
at the Institute of International Relations (IRI) of Rio
de Janeiro’s Pontifical Catholic University, the visit
to the Middle East, and particularly Libya, is “an
explicit show of the Brazilian government’s anti-Americanism.”
Yasser
Arafat uses Lula’s trip
As Brazil’s leftist government cozied up to dictatorial
regimes and terrorist-sponsoring states, Yasser Arafat (who
the U.S. and Israel often accuse of promoting Palestinian
terrorism) saw Lula’s trip to the Middle East as an
opportunity to end his international isolation. As part
of this tactic, Arafat decided to invite Brazil to join
a special task force.
According to the press, the invitation
from the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) is a calculated
political gamble to create a group of countries interested
in the “Palestinian cause” to force some decisions
on the Group of Four (the United States, the European Union,
the U.N. and Russia) regarding the “road map,”
and show Arafat’s displeasure at the way the United
States leads the Group of Four.
In Egypt, PNA’s Nabil Shaath met
with President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva for almost
an hour. He gave him a letter signed by Yasser Arafat. In
the letter Arafat asks the Brazilian government to continue
supporting the Palestinian cause as Brazil fills a non-permanent
slot at the U.N. Security Council. Arafat also reaffirmed
his friendship for Lula. The two have been longtime friends
and have met several times in the past.
Brasil is supposed to open a diplomatic
office or embassy in Ramallah, another indication of Lula’s
rapprochement with Arafat.
Lula did not visit Israel, yet contacted
the PNA. Curiously enough, diplomats in the Lula da Silva
government continued to claim that Brazil remains “impartial”
vis-à-vis the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Lula’s
muted reaction to the arrest of Saddam Hussein
The reaction of the Brazilian government to the arrest of
Saddam Hussein was also revealing.
Lula made no comment on the matter. Itamaraty
merely said the arrest “represents a turning point
in the Iraqi situation” that will “contribute
to accelerate the Iraqi people’s transition to self-government.”
According to the Reuters news agency,
Marco Aurélio Garcia, presidential aide for international
affairs, had earlier called Saddam’s arrest the “end
of the symbol of resistance.” He added: ”I believe
the arrest will accelerate the peace process in Iraq; this
is the end of the symbol of resistance. The head has been
decapitated.”
The Brazilian reaction appears to show
uneasiness with the dictator’s imprisonment. At no
moment was there a censure of Saddam’s regime or an
expression of congratulations for his arrest: only a cold
reckoning of a change in direction. By calling Saddam the
head of the “resistance,” the presidential aide
ends up by legitimizing the terrorist attacks that kill
coalition troops and a large number of Iraqis and hinder
the pacification of the country.
Furthermore, official statements from Brazilian
diplomacy always show a desire to make coalition forces
leave Iraq.
The reaction of Brazil’s leftist
government to Saddam’s arrest was very similar to
that of the Syrian government.
Three days after Saddam’s arrest,
and perhaps because of the uneasiness caused by Lula’s
silence, the newspaper O Estado de S. Paulo reported
that President Bush had called Lula. During the call, Lula
reportedly mentioned Saddam’s arrest only to say that
it is important for a new phase of democratic transition
in Iraq.
* * *
As we end this analysis of the Lula da
Silva administration’s foreign policy, it is well
to ask: Behind this unprecedented initiative to create a
united front with South America and Arab countries, isn’t
there an intent to foment North-South conflict?
Lula
Fooling the World Lula's party covered up its
historic radicalism during the
elections, but now in power is
gradually re-nationalizing formerly
privatized assets.
Brazil
says NO to Gun Control - October 27, 2005
The international left was monitoring with great expectations the results
of Brazil’s weekend referendum on a nationwide ban on the sale of
guns and ammunition. A Yes vote would have been celebrated as a victory
for gun control not only in Brazil but worldwide.
